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Harnessing the Cloud:
International Law Implications of Cloud-Computing
Vineeth Narayanan*

Abstract
For decades, with the advent of better andfaster computer chips, processor speed has
grown exponentially, and with it, the demandfor computingpower. Now, as thatgrowth slows
due to technological bottlenecks, the world will look to solutions like cloud-computing to ensure
that the ever-increasing demand of computingpower is met. Thus, the needfor effident, reliable,
andpowerful cloud-computing services will lead to and necessitateglobal cloud-computing service
providers. But their vitalness will also bring cloud-computing under the scrutiny of government
regulation, as countries struggle to ensure that the data of their citizeny is protected. This
Comment explores the intersection of cloud-computing and internationallaw by examining two
states of the world, one in which countries attempt to give their data protection laws
extraterritorialeffect and the second in which countries oraniZe to provide a global solution to
the regulation of the cloud. The Commentfinds that though there isjustification under existing
international law for countries' cloud computing regulations to have extraterritorialeffect,
cooperation will yield greater adaptabiliofor the regulatory system and stability for the
computing cloud itself
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1961, John McCarthy, the man who coined the phrase "artificial
intelligence," predicted computing power would become a public utility, that is,
a service directly provided or heavily regulated by the government.' Today,
personal computers have become ubiquitous, and cloud-computing, which
provides shared public access to a modern necessity, is subject to increasing
regulation, coming close to fulfilling McCarthy's prediction. As more and more
data, applications, and even entire operating systems are uploaded to the cloud, a
public utility of another form is emerging: a global cloud-computing system.
Cloud-computing links remote computers, so that users can access remote
data storage and computation services. It also allows users to increase their
effective computing power by tapping into a network of data servers. The
potential for cost saving, convenience, and efficiency is tremendous. In addition,
cloud-computing gives businesses without the resources to purchase raw
computing power, like those in developing countries, the ability to access this
power through the cloud, thus helping them compete in the global market.
These computing clouds have grown to include more users across different
countries, frequently moving personal data across multiple jurisdictions and
inevitably raising concerns over data protection. And in the wake of one the

I

See Eva Dou, Is Europe Readv to Put Its Data in the Clouds? (Reuters Apr 27, 2011), online at
http://af.reuters.com/article/ethiopiaNews/idAFLDE7341NU20110426?pageNumber= 1&virtu
alBrandChannel=0 (visited Oct 24, 2011); John McCarthy, speaking at the MIT Centennial
(1961), in Simson L. Garfinkel, Architects of the Information Society, Thiry-Five Years of the Laboratoyfor
ComputerSence atMIT 1, 5 1 (MIT 1999).
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largest data breaches in history, 2 politicians are sure to rally support for new and
more restrictive data protection regimes. As legislators in each jurisdiction
attempt to pass laws that protect their own constituents, jurisdictional issues
arise that threaten the stability of an international cloud-computing regime.
This Comment attempts to analyze and resolve the international law
implications of cloud-computing by identifying two possible equilibrium states
of a global cloud-computing system. The first state is one in which countries use
jurisdictional theories to give their data-protection laws extraterritorial effect.
The second state is one in which countries cooperate through an international
agreement or organization to find a common solution to the risk of data loss in
cloud-computing. Section II begins the discussion by providing background
information about cloud-computing and the basic forms of domestic data
protection law. This Section also argues that cloud-computing will become
increasingly relevant as processor speeds reach certain technological bottlenecks.
Section III addresses the first equilibrium state by discussing the viability of
different jurisdictional theories that states may use to justify cloud-computing
regulation with extraterritorial effect. Section IV addresses the second
equilibrium state by describing three ways in which international cooperation
may manifest itself. Section V concludes.
II. CLOUD-COMPUTING
Cloud-computing services, offered by cloud-computing service providers
(CCSPs), represent a collection of technologies aimed at "allowing access to
large amounts of computing power in a fully virtualized manner." 3 The cloudcomputing service is a system by which individuals can access computing power
remotely by storing data on centralized servers, as if in a cloud.4 Perhaps the best
example of this kind of service is one that is almost ubiquitous now: web-based
email services like Gmail and Hotmail. Increasingly, businesses have turned their
attention towards cloud-computing. They see it as a "hyper-efficient means of
distributing digital services," and thus as a potential cost-saving measure.
Indeed, lesser-known CCSPs, like Amazon, Cisco, and Microsoft, have catered
2

Erica Ogg, Sony Needs to Do More for PSN Customers (CNET News May 17, 2011), online at
http://news.cnet.com/8301 -31021_3-20063400-260.htil (visited Oct 24, 2011) (identifying Sony
PlayStation Network's data loss as "the second-largest data breach in US history").

3

William Voorsluy, James Broberg, and Rajkumar Buyya, Introduction to Cloud Computing, in
Rajkumar Buyya, James Broberg, and Andrzej Goscinski, eds, Cloud Computing: Prindiles and
Paradigms3, 5 1.1 (Wiley 2011).

4

Id.

5

See Steve Lohr, The Business Market Plays Cloud Computing Catch-Up (NY Times Apr 14, 2011),
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/business/15cloud.html?r=1&hpw (visited Oct
24, 2011).
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to this group by offering not only data storage but computing processing
services.' In addition, Google has introduced Google Chrome OS, an operating
system designed to function almost completely through the cloud, providing
essentially remote computing software that can be updated automatically
through the web.'
There are three main types of cloud-computing services: (1) Infrastructure
as a Service (IaaS), (2) Platform as a Service (PaaS), and (3) Software as a Service
(SasS). These form the "layers" of a cloud where the services that are more
sophisticated depend on lower layers to function.' IaaS includes computation,
storage, and communications, and it represents the bottom layer of the cloud.
Amazon Web Services, for example, mainly offers IaaS.' PaaS refers to a "cloud
platform," which offers an environment where developers create and host web
applications. Google App Engine is an example of a PaaS.' 0 SaaS is the top layer
of the cloud, and it provides users with fully functioning applications that rest
entirely on the cloud. Recognizable examples of these services are Google Docs,
Google Spreadsheets, and the Chrome OS discussed above."
Importantly, cloud-computing, particularly at the PaaS stage, represents an
environment "on which developers create and deploy applications and do not
necessariy need to know how many processors or how much memory [those] applications will be
using." 2 When software developers write software for normal operating systems
designed to run on computers, applications must be written in such a way so as
not to use too much power or memory while also being able to coexist with
other applications. With platform cloud-computing, however, developers are
able to assume that platforms that run on the cloud can utilize an effectively
unbounded processor speed and memory. "Cloud-computing gives the illusion
of infinite computing resources available on demand"; thus, such a system
requires that "additional resources can be (a) provisioned, possibly automatically,
when an application load increases and (b) released when load decreases."" A
6

See Nancy Gohring, Microsoft, Cisco, IBM and Others Form Cloud Computing Group (PC World Dec 8,
2009), online at http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/184063/microsoft_ciscoibm_
andothersform_cloudcomputinggroup.html (visited Oct 24, 2011) (noting that Amazon is
conspicuously absent from the Enterprise Cloud Buyers Council).

7

See Introducing the Google Chrome OS (Official Google Blog July 7, 2009), online at
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/07/introducing-google-chrome-os.html
(visited Oct 24,
2011).

8

Voorsluy, Broberg, and Buyya, Cloud Computing § 1.3 at 13-14 (cited in note 3).

9

Id at 14, 5 1.3.1.

10

Id.

11

Id at 15,

12

1.3.3.
Voorsluy, Broberg, and Buyya, Cloud Computing at 14, § 1.3.2 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).

13

Id at 16-17, § 1.4.3.
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global network of cloud-computing systems would need to function with
comparable elasticity, that is, it must be able to move resources across systems as
quickly and freely as possible.14 For example, because of energy consumption
concerns at individual data centers, CCSPs require "Dynamic Resource
Allocation," which matches power supply to demand and avoids overheating."
In order to run this system efficiently, CCSPs must be able to move data freely
between servers, the "nodes" of the cloud-computing system, which will likely
be located in multiple jurisdictions." As these CCSPs join together and remove
barriers between services, providers will aim to take advantage of efficiencies of
scale and offer a wider range of services to an ever-larger geographic region."
Therefore, global or regional CCSPs will inevitably run up against
international law, particularly data protection law and privacy regulations." As
individual and corporate users of CCSPs put their data on the cloud, they are
exposed to the risk of data loss and violations of privacy in exchange for more
efficient storage and information access. It may be in the best interest of the
CCSPs to minimize that risk, making government intervention unnecessary.
Nevertheless, states have stepped in to ensure that loss of citizens' data is
sufficiently deterred. 9 For instance, the EU's Data Protection Directive
regulates the processing of personal data in the EU.20 It lays out a set of
minimum protective standards and a conflict of laws regime aimed at breaking
down barriers between individual nations' incompatible sets of privacy and data
protection laws.21 At the heart of the Directive, and for the purposes of this
Comment, the rules break down into two types: (1) adequacy protections and (2)
rights to data.22 The latter type includes, but is not limited to, the rights to
14

Id.

is

Id at 19, § 1.5.1.
See Voorsluy, Broberg, and Buyya, Cloud Computing at 19, § 1.5.1 (cited in note 3).
See Cisco Beefs Up Cloud Computing Push (Wall Street Journal Dec 6, 2011), online at
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/12/06/cisco-beefs-up-cloud-computing-push/?mod=WSJBlo
g&utmsource=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter (visited Dec 9, 2011) (noting Cisco's move
toward shifting traffic from one data center to another). This is related to a concept called
Distributed Computing. For more about distributed computing, see Introduction to DistributedSystem
Design (Google Code University), online at http://code.google.com/edu/parallel/dsdtutorial.html (visited Dec 9, 2011).
See id at § 1.8.1 at 35.

16
17

is
19
20

See Dou, Is Europe Ready? at 5 (cited in note 1).
See EU Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processingof PersonalDataand on the Free
Movement of Such Data, Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 OJ (L 281) 31 (EU Data Protection
Directive).

21

See generally id.

2

Compare id at Art 25 ("[A]dequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be
assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data
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access, correct, and erase personal data. It may also include regulations
restricting private data to certain locations or imposing durational limits on the
retention of such data exiting the territory.23 Other countries have modeled their
privacy regulations after the Directive and thus have similar systems.2 4
One may ask whether a close analysis of cloud-computing regulation is
relevant in a world in which technology is advancing so rapidly that cloudcomputing itself may quickly become obsolete. Though there are cost-saving
and data-protection advantages related to the use of cloud-computing services, if
better and faster processors and computers are created, cloud-computing will
not reach the kind of ubiquity and relevance that would necessitate international
cooperation on the issue. However, as many in the semiconductor industry have
noted, there are "a set of impending bottlenecks ... where more than five
decades of progress in continuously shrinking the size of transistors used in
computation will end." 25 As innovation enabling faster processor speeds and
larger memory begins to decline, users will inevitably look to cloud-computing
services to increase their effective processing power and storage capacity. If this
"bottleneck" is not averted, many industries may come to depend on cloudcomputing services as a supplement to, or even a substitute for, their own
computing services. Even if a solution to the "bottleneck" is developed, this
Comment predicts that cloud-computing will become a public utility because
individuals and firms alike will look to the cloud to close the gap between
inherently limited non-cloud-computing power and their demand for high
computing performance.

23

transfer operations."), with id at Art 12 ("Right of Access"), with id at Art 14 ("Right to Object"),
with id at § IX ("Notification").
See Ephraim Schwartz, The Dangers of Cloud Computing (InfoWorld July 7, 2008) online at
http://www.infoworld.com/d/cloud-computing/dangers-cloud-computing-839?page=0,2
(visited Oct 24, 2011):
For example, the European Union places strict limits on what data can be
stored on its citizens and for how long. Many banking regulators also require
customers' financial data to stay in their home country. Many compliance
regulations require that data not be intermixed with other data, such as on
shared servers or databases.

24

US Department of Commerce, Internaional Data Protection Legislation Matrix, online at
http://www.accurateinformationsystems.com/docs/International DataProtection.Laws.pdf
(visited Oct 24, 2011) (producing a list of countries with data protection regimes and identifying
regimes similar to that of the EU Directive).

25

John Markoff, Remapping Computer Circuitty to Avert Impenaing Bottlenecks (NY Times Feb 28, 2011),
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/science/01compute.html?adxnl=&adxnnlx
=1300844049-69AdgALoBIHG5894HCJGsg (visited Oct 24,2011).
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III. INTERNATIONAL LAW JURISDICTION FOR CLOUDCOMPUTING REGULATION
As discussed above, existing data protection regulation does not entirely
foresee the kind of cloud-computing regime we may expect once cloudcomputing becomes a necessary component of production. Yet this kind of
regime-in which each country utilizing cloud-computing services establishes its
own data protection laws and mechanisms-may represent an equilibrium state
of the system. To guarantee stability, however, the individual protection regimes
must establish extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law.
This section outlines different jurisdictional grounds under international
law that may justify effective cloud-computing regulation. The first part
discusses three preliminary assumptions for the jurisdictional analysis: (1) the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is permitted unless existing international
law prohibits it; (2) the data protection laws at issue are public rather than
private law; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is "reasonable." The second part
of this section begins the analysis and concerns both the objective and subjective
territorial principle. The third part discusses the nationality principle. The fourth
part discusses the passive personality principle. Finally, the fifth part discusses
the protective principle.
A. Preliminary Assumptions
The first assumption concerns the ability of states to extend jurisdiction
under international law. This type of system is predicated on an international law
regime buttressed by the case of Lotus, in which the Permanent Court of
International Justice determined that there is no restriction on states' exercise of
26
jurisdiction unless there is international law prohibiting such an exercise.
Though the Lotus principle has been criticized over the years,27 the International
Court of Justice advisory opinion concerning Kosovo's unilateral declaration of
independence suggests that the principle is still salient." Moreover, because
cloud-computing represents a brand new frontier for international law, the
principle that everything that is not expressly forbidden is allowed seems more
acceptable and perhaps even essential.
With regard to the second assumption, it is important to note that the cases
discussed below deal almost exclusively with so-called "public law," such as
criminal and antitrust law. International "private law," on the other hand, such
26

SS Lotus (Fr v Turkey), 1927 PCIJ (ser A) No 10 (Sept 7, 1927).

27

See Helmut Philipp Aust, Complidly and the Law of State Responsibility 67-68 (Cambridge 2011).
See id at 68, citing Accordance with InternationalLaw of the UnilateralDeclaration of Independence in Respect

28

of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion,
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as tort and property, is mainly determined by conflict of law provisions within
contracts. When such provisions are omitted from contracts, conflict of law
provisions in public law, like parts of the EU Directive, are meant to determine
which laws apply.29 Data protection is an area of mixed private and public law,
so some provisions in certain circumstances may apply as public law.3 0 It is
neither useful nor imperative to analyze specific regulations in order to
determine which provisions are public and which are private.3 1 Instead, for the
purposes of this Comment, I assume that all regulations may act as public law.
Indeed, if these were private laws, they would only have minimum effect, as
CCSPs maintain greater bargaining power as utilities and would strive to include
conflict of law provisions that would, in equilibrium, bring their activity under
the least strict set of laws. If cloud-computing becomes a public utility, as
predicted, CCSPs will either not be permitted to contract out of such provisions,
or there will be sufficient competition among CCSPs to compete away providers
that choose to use conflict of laws provisions to bring their activity under the
least restrictive laws.
Finally, all justifications for jurisdiction are necessarily influenced by
Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. This section
provides that "a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise
of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." 32
B. Territorial Principle
1. Subjective territorial principle.
States have the power to prescribe public law in their own territory.33
Historically, this justification has been narrowly used by states to prescribe laws
for their own geographic territories. This may be due to the fact that
"unrestricted movement of individuals or of property to or from other countries
did not in the past occur so readily or frequently as between states bounded for
the most part by land frontiers. 34 More recently, there have been a number of
extensions of this principle, as countries cast a wider net in their legislating

29
30

Barry E. Carter, Phillip R. Trimble, and Allen S. Weiner, eds, InternationalLaw657-58 (Aspen 5th
ed 2007).
See Christopher Kuner, Data ProtectionIaw and InternationalJurisdiction on the Internet (Part1), 18 Intl
176, 181-83 (2010).

J L & Info Tech
31

Id at 182.

§ 403(1)

32

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law

33

Id at

34

I.A. Shearer, Starke's InternationalLanw183 (Butterworths 11th ed 1994).

(1986).

§ 402(1)(a).
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powers in response to other states' inadequate adjudication of certain matters.3 5
The subjective territorial principle extended jurisdiction to activities commenced
within a state's geographical territory but completed or consummated in other
territories. This is now part of international law with regard to specific realms of
activity, namely currency counterfeiting and drug trafficking." Though this form
of territorial jurisdiction is not widely accepted as a general principle, the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law leaves room for its expanded application.
Section 402, entitled "Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe," provides that "a state
has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . conduct that wholly or in
substanialpart[]takes place within its territory."3 7
In Treag v DPP," a UK case, the defendant attempted to blackmail a
woman in Germany through a letter he wrote in England. The English law
stated that a person was guilty of blackmail if he made an "unwarranted demand
with menaces."" The defendant argued that he made no such demand in
England, but the House of Lords disagreed, stating that he made the demand
when he wrote the letter in England." This is a straightforward example of the
subjective territorial principle, in which the activity in question, blackmail, began
in England, and even though it was completed or consummated in another
territory, English law applied.
In Ong Ab Chuan v PP,41 a Singapore case, the defendant appealed a lower
court conviction of trafficking heroin. The defendant argued that he was merely
carrying the drugs and that there was no evidence of trafficking.42 The court
importantly drew a distinction between transporting drugs for one's own
personal use, which was not "trafficking" under the relevant law, and the act of
transporting with the intent to distribute, whether achieved or not.4 Within the realm
of drug trafficking, then, the court took a broad view of the subjective territorial
principle. By stating that possessing with the mere intent of distributing, without
actual consummation, was still captured by Singapore law, the court endorsed an

3s
36

37

38
39
4

See Carter, Trimble, and Weiner, InternationalLaw at 661 (cited in note 29).
See International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency (1929), 112 League
of Nations Treaty Ser 371 (1931); Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in
Dangerous Drugs (1936), 198 League of Nations Treaty Set 301 (1939).
Restatement 5 402(1)(a) (cited in note 32) (emphasis added).
Treag v Director of Publc Prosecutions, [1971] 1 All ER 110 (HL 1970) (UK).
See P.G. Fitzpatrick, The Location of a Crime: A Comment on Treacy v. Director of Public
Prosecutions, 21 Intl & Comp L Q 160, 160 (1972), citing Theft Act, ch 60, § 21(1) (UK 1968).
Fitzpatrick, 21 Intl & Comp L Q at 160-61 (cited in note 39).

41

OngAh Chuan v Publ Prosecutor,[1981] AC 648 (Singapore).

42

Id at 663.

43

Id at 668.
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extension of exterritorial jurisdiction based merely on intent to commit a crime,
suggesting that "commencement" for purposes of the subjective territorial
principle may be read broadly.
Countries may find that the subjective territorial principle provides a
jurisdictional basis to bind CCSPs to their cloud-computing regulations. Under
this line of reasoning, with regard to adequacy measure regulation, when there is
harm related to data loss or theft, states can use the entire chain of data-made
up of data transfers between servers-to identify specific servers that do not
abide by the given adequacy measure. Once identified, the injured country or
party could extend that country's jurisdiction to the CCSP controlling the rogue
server under the theory that their inadequate protection began with compiling
the data from the user in the injured country. Though Ong Ah Chuan suggests
that the activity under the purview of the law may be read very broadly, applying
such a broad view to data collection could be considered an overextension of
the principle. However, concerns over data protection with regard to cloudcomputing, which, as discussed above, necessarily requires that data freely move
across borders, are similar to those over other activities covered by the
subjective territorial principle. Drug trafficking and counterfeiting currency laws
both aim to ensure that those who commence such activities cannot escape
liability by moving across borders. Similarly, the goal of cloud-computing
regulation is to ensure that the CCSPs cannot escape the onus of an adequacy
measure or a right to access by moving data across borders. Because the
character of these activities is similar, and because international law may be
broadened to apply to the accumulation of data, the subjective territorial
principle could be used to provide jurisdiction for cloud-computing regulations.
2. Objective territorial principle.
Under the objective territorial principle, the state's jurisdiction is extended
to those acts that are commenced in another state's territory but are either (a)
consummated or completed in its territory or (b) produce harmful consequences
in the territory of the party extending jurisdiction." The first component of this
principle is the complement to the subjective territorial principle. Thus, the
states of both the blackmailer and the blackmailed in Treaq would have
jurisdiction over the defendant. It is difficult to imagine a way in which cloudcomputing regulations could be justified under this part of the objective
territorial principle. The activity in question, which would most likely be
inadequately protecting data, would either have not been completed in the
regulating country, putting it outside of the purview of this principle, or would

4

See Carter, Trimble, and Weiner, InternaionalLawat 661 (cited in note 29).
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have been completed in the country, placing the CCSP within the purview of the
regulation under traditional theories of territorial jurisdiction.
The second component of this principle has come to be known as the
"effects doctrine." This doctrine suggests that jurisdiction arises when the effects
of a particular activity are direct and are "so reprehensible [in] nature, . . .
economic or otherwise, as to attract or necessitate such jurisdiction."15 The
seminal case for this principle is the 1927 Lotus case. There, the French ship
Lotus collided with a Turkish ship. The collision was due to the apparent gross
negligence of the officer on watch on the Lotus. It resulted in the deaths of eight
Turkish nationals. Turkey brought proceedings against the officer of the watch,
a French national, claiming that the negligent act created "effects" on a part of
Turkish territory: the boat itself.46 The Permanent Court of International Justice
found that jurisdiction "was not inconsistent with international law."47
Since this ruling, other countries, including the US, have recognized
extraterritorial extensions of jurisdiction based, implicitly or explicitly, on the
effects doctrine.48 In the Wood Pulp case, for example, the European
Commission fined two trade associations with registered offices in Canada,
Finland, Switzerland, and the US for violating European Economic Community
(EEC) laws prohibiting price-fixing, exchanges of information on prices, and the
export or resale of wood pulp from the EEC. 49 The trade associations argued
that the Commission had no jurisdiction to impose the fines, and the central
question for the European Court was whether the "effects doctrine" could be
justifiably applied. Though the Court declined to expressly invoke or endorse the
effects doctrine, it upheld jurisdiction on narrow grounds." The Court utilized a
principle known in the EU as the "implementation requirement."' Under this
principle, states are only justified in using the effects doctrine when those effects
are "intended, direct and substantial."52 Though similar to the effects doctrine,
this heightened standard demanding that effects be more closely tied to the state
45

Id at 663.

46

Id at 662.

47

Id.
See United States v Alcoa, 148 F2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir 1945); HarfordFire Insurance Co v Cakfornia,
509 US 764, 798 (1993) (holding that international comity does not stop exercise of jurisdiction);
See Vaughan Lowe, InternationalLaw and the Efects Doctrine in the European Court ofJustice, 48 Camb
L J 9, 9-11 (1989), discussing A. Ahlstr6m Osakeyhtii v Commission (the Wood Pu Case)
(unreported).

48

49

Lowe, 48 Camb L J at 9 (cited in note 48).

5

Id at 10.

51

Id.

52

Paul L.C. Torremans, ExtraterritorialApplicationofE.C and U.S. Competition Law, 21 Eur L Rev 280,
284 (1996).
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extending jurisdiction is crucial in determining the breadth and scope of cloudcomputing regulation."
One area of regulation that may shed light on the treatment of cloudcomputing regulation under international law is legislation concerning content
on Internet websites. In the Yahoo! Case,54 the dispute centered on Nazi-related
items available on the Yahoo! auction site, allegedly in violation of a provision in
the French penal code prohibiting the selling of such items. The Tribunal de
Grande Instance found that French courts did have jurisdiction because the
placement of items for sale "caused damage to be suffered by La Ligue Contre le
Racisme et L'Antisemitism and 'Union des Etudiants Juifs de France, two
organizations dedicated to fighting anti-Semitism."" Since both of these
organizations were in France, the Tribunal reasoned, France had jurisdiction to
hear the case. On appeal, Yahoo! claimed that France did not have jurisdiction,
because all of the elements that made up the offense in question were
committed outside of France.5 ' The Tribunal concluded, however, that because
the content was available in French territory through the Internet, the elements
"materialized" both abroad and in France." Similarly, in a German case, Toben,
concerning an Australian who expressed revisionist views of the Holocaust, the
Federal Court of Justice found that an element of the offense in question,
"agitation of the people," had occurred in Germany, and thus that German
jurisdiction was valid."
With this understanding of the effects doctrine, as well as its more onerous
cousin, the implementation requirement, one may determine whether this
incarnation of the objective territorial principle may be used to provide
jurisdiction for cloud-computing regulation. The argument for jurisdiction under
the effects doctrine component of the objective territorial principle is
straightforward. In the event of a violation of a state's data protection or privacy
laws, the state seeking to extend jurisdiction would argue that the harm suffered
was an "effect" of the violation, even if that act was committed wholly outside
of the state's territory. Under this reasoning, a failure either to meet adequacy

53

See id at 288.

54

UEJF v Yahoo! Inc, TGI Paris, Ordonnancede R6f6, Nos 00/05308, 00/05309 (May 22, 2000)
(Yahoo! Case).

55

See Yahoo! Inc v La Lgue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemiisme, 433 F3d 1199, 1225 (9th Cir 2006),
discussing the Yahoo! Case.
Mika Hayashi, Objective TerritorialPrincaple or Effects Doctrine?:Jurisdiction and Cyberspace, 2006 In Law
284, 292-93 (2006).

56
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standards or to provide rights to data causing economic harm to individuals or
business entities in the state implicates the regulation. This argument is
buttressed by the fact that courts, as in the Wood Pulp case, have considered
economic harms sufficient to trigger jurisdiction under the effects doctrine.5'
One may argue that unlike the economic harms suffered in the antitrust
cases such as the Wood Pulp case, in which the effects doctrine seemed to be
implicated, some of the potential harms related to loss of data (or more
appropriately loss of control over data) are less pecuniary. These harms include
emotional distress due to loss of private data and other inchoate harms. Thus,
under a heightened "implementation requirement" standard, there is a question
as to whether these non-pecuniary harms would be "substantial" enough to
invoke the effects doctrine as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, in
the internet cases, Yahoo! and Toben, the harmful effects felt inside the territories
of France and Germany were non-pecuniary and abstract, yet the courts upheld
jurisdiction under the effects doctrine."o
This is not to say, however, that if more abstract harms are insufficient to
trigger the effects doctrine, there are no other injuries related to a violation of a
cloud-computing regulation. There are potential harms, such as loss of profits by
a corporation, identity theft, and loss of trade secrets, that are classic and
tangible economic harms. Even assuming that the effects doctrine cannot
provide a jurisdictional basis for non-pecuniary harms, existing applications of
international law suggest that a state has jurisdiction over activities abroad that
cause measurable harmful effects in that state. Thus, under international law,
states could enjoy at least a narrow justifiable extension of jurisdiction over
violations of cloud-computing regulations under the effects doctrine.
C. Nationality
The power of states to prescribe laws covering the activities of its nationals
is uncontroversial and is recognized by the Restatement." Under the active
nationality principle, an iteration of the nationality principle discussed in this
section, a state has jurisdiction over proceedings against any of its nationals.
"The active nationality principle is generally conceded by international law to all
states desiring to apply it."62 This principle, then, provides states with the ability
to prescribe cloud-computing regulations for their nationals at home or abroad.
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However, there are disagreement and controversy over the definition of
"corporate nationality." Under one definition, and generally under US practice, a
corporation is a national of the state in which it is incorporated.6 3 There are also
instances in which the US has extended nationality jurisdiction to corporations
"owned or controlled" by US citizens.64 This includes subsidiaries of US
companies incorporated abroad. If this is a legitimate extension of nationality
jurisdiction under international law, one can imagine an equilibrium solution to a
system of domestic cloud-computing regulations with international reach. In this
system, CCSP corporations include equity holders from all countries utilizing
that particular provider. If a CCSP did not meet adequacy measures or
sufficiently honor rights to data, nationality jurisdiction would allow injured
states, through equity holders, to bring that CCSP under domestic laws to
adjudicate the matter. This kind of solution might be particularly attractive
because it would require no explicit agreement between nations, only an
understanding that, under international law, nationality jurisdiction extends to
corporations in which states had a sufficient amount of equity.
However, there are cases that suggest such an extension of nationality
jurisdiction is not recognized under international law. When the US has
extended jurisdiction in this way, for example, it has spurred protests and
countermeasures in foreign countries, as well as rulings in favor of those states.s
In Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles SA v Sensor Nederland BT6" a French
corporation placed an order with a Dutch corporation that subsequently was
bought by an American corporation. The order was destined for the USSR.
After Sensor became a subsidiary of the US corporation, it claimed that it was
bound by a US export embargo to the USSR and reneged on the deal." The
District Court of the Hague considered and rejected extraterritorial jurisdiction
based on the nationality principle. The court stated that even if the embargo's
language giving itself jurisdiction over corporations "owned or controlled" by
American nationals was a "yardstick for the (U.S.) nationality of the
corporation," the idea of nationality jurisdiction's extending to such parties,
according to views held outside the US, was "dubious."
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In the case of SA Fruehauf a French corporation 70 percent Americanowned and 30 percent French-owned won a bid to supply a large number of
trailers to a French company. When the US learned that the trailers were bound
for China, they ordered Fruehauf to cancel the order in accordance with the
Trade with the Enemy Act." The three French directors of the company
petitioned a French court to appoint an administrator that would take control of
the company and carry out the contract, implicitly soliciting the court to exercise
its own nationality jurisdiction over Fruehauf. The French courts obliged, and
the case eventually resulted in additional French legislation designed to protect
national corporations from foreign control.70 A later case, Dreser, which
involved a similar set of facts, also ended with the host nation prevailing over
foreign (or home country) interests.n
As these cases suggest, an extension of the nationality principle to
prescribe laws for corporations in which nationals merely have an equity interest
is heavily resisted, and it may not be a recognized extension of jurisdiction under
international law. But this limitation on jurisdiction may also have the effect of
encouraging international cooperation. Given the fact that the largest CCSPs are
US entities (for example, Amazon and Google), the limitation on nationality
jurisdiction would constrain the US' ability to prescribe cloud-computing
regulations for all world users of these CCSPs. Limiting the US' extraterritorial
jurisdiction in this way prevents the US from dictating the relevant terms of a
global cloud-computing regulatory scheme. Thus, if these CCSPs want to have
subsidiaries in the countries they service, which they likely will, those
corporations would be subject to the host country's regulations.72
D. Passive Personality
The passive personality, or passive nationality, principle provides
jurisdiction to a state for foreign activities that cause injury to nationals of that
state. This principle is most frequently applied in response to terrorist attacks.
In the 1887 Cutting case, a US citizen was charged with criminal libel in Mexico
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Cynthia Day Wallace, The MultinationalEnteprise and Legal Control: Host State Soveregnty in an Era of
Economic Globadiaion602-05 (Martinus Nijhoff 2002), citing Sociiti Fnehaufv Massard, [1968] DS
Jur 147, [1965] JCP 1114, 274 (Fr).
Wallace, The MultinationalEnterprise at 604-05 (cited in note 69).
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See text accompanying note 63.
See Geoff Gilbert. Responding to International Crime 88-90 (Martinus Nijhoff 2006). See also
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after publishing an article criticizing a Mexican citizen.74 Though the case was
resolved through diplomatic means, and the Mexican court that convicted
Cutting did not discuss whether the passive personality principle could be a basis
for doing so, the incident did result in a US Department of State letter that
explicitly stated that the passive personality principle was not a basis for
extraterritoriality jurisdiction. 7s
This view remained dominant in the US for over a hundred years. In the
Lotus case, discussed above, the statute Turkey used to justify jurisdiction
provided that "[a]ny foreigner who ... commit[ed] an offence abroad to the
prejudice of Turkey or of a Turkish subject" would be subject to Turkey's
Though the majority opinion by the Permanent Court of
jurisdiction.
International Justice did not discuss passive personality jurisdiction, a dissenting
opinion argued that customary international law did not permit it. This notion
was reflected in the Convention on the High Seas of 1958, which provided that
"only the flag state or the responsible officer's home state could prosecute the
officer for collisions or other incidents of navigation on the high seas."7 "
Yet in more recent years the US has appeared to use the passive personality
principle as a basis for jurisdiction in the realm of terrorist crime, by signing on
to international agreements like the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents, which arguably reflect the principle. Some commentators
argue, however, that the actuating principle in these agreements is the protective
principle, discussed below. 80 In 1984, the US Congress passed legislation to
implement the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which provided that
even if an offense was committed outside the US, the statute would apply if the
offender took a US national hostage." In 1992, Congress passed a measure to
make international terrorism a federal crime. The legislation also provided civil
remedies for "[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism."8 2 Though
one may argue that the jurisdictional theory upon which these pieces of
74
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legislation are based is the protective principle, not the passive personality
principle, the statutory language suggests that the conduct that triggers
jurisdiction is an act against nationals."
The first obstacle to the use of this principle in justifying extraterritorial
jurisdiction for cloud-computing regulation is determining whether the passive
personality principle can reasonably be extended outside of the criminal context.
The central question here is whether the injuries that may result from inadequate
data protection are the kinds of harms that justify protection under the passive
personality principle. Some of the more straightforward economic harms, such
as a company's losing profits due to data loss, are so different from the harms
used to justify the principle that, at present, international law would likely not
support its use in this context. There are other harms, however, such as
violations of individual privacy-a principle recognized by the UN as a human
right-that may be sufficiently severe.84 Thus, similar to the discussion
concerning the effects doctrine, one could argue that jurisdiction for cloudcomputing regulations under the passive personality principle would arise on a
case-by-case basis, when the resulting harms were significant enough. States
would use this form of extraterritorial jurisdiction to protect their nationals
against CCSPs that injure them by violating adequacy measures or by
insufficiently protecting rights to data. Moreover, given that it might be difficult
to determine exactly where these harms occur (for example, when data is
transferred through multiple servers across different jurisdictions) and given that
the country in which the service is incorporated may not have great incentives to
bring actions against the CCSP, cloud-computing regulations may be an ideal
application of the passive personality principle.
E. Protective Principle
States may also exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over activities that
affect vital security or economic interests.s The Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law provides that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to "certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is
directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state
interests."" Comment (f) of the Restatement describes this "limited class" as
"offenses threatening the integrity of governmental functions," such as
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86

Restatement § 402(3) (cited in note 32).

83
84

Winter 2012

799

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

"espionage, counterfeiting of the state's seal or currency, falsification of official
documents, as well as perjury before consular officials, and conspiracy to violate
the immigration or customs laws."" These are situations where the offense in
question was sufficiently grave so as to implicate an important interest of the
state, as well as situations where without such jurisdiction the offense would not
be punished." As noted in the preceding section, given the logistics of a cloudcomputing service, one might expect that the place of the offense would be
difficult to identify and that the home country may not have the proper
incentives to punish violations of cloud-computing regulations. This argument
notwithstanding, there are likely only a very limited number of situations where
cloud-computing harms would implicate national security issues or rise to the
level of the "limited class."" There are instances in the law of the sea, however,
that suggest that the protective principle is used to extend jurisdiction to matters
outside of criminal offenses. In Article 65 of the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), parties to the Convention are permitted to "regulate the
exploitation of marine mammals" in an exclusive economic zone, a defined area
off the coast of a state.o But Article 120 extends this right to the high seas.9 1
Though this does not grant states jurisdiction over marine mammals in other
states' extended territory under the treaty, it arguably represents extraterritorial
jurisdiction justified by the protective principle in a non-criminal context.9 2
States that use the protective principle to extend jurisdiction to CCSPs
must argue that those extraterritorial activities threaten vital economic or
security interests of the state. As individuals continue to utilize cloud-computing
services, more and more sensitive data are likely to be stored in the cloud. A
state may argue that under such circumstances, CCSPs that do not adequately
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protect data pose a serious threat to the interests of the state. Though the threat
would likely not rise to the level of a vital security interest in the same vein as
terrorism, a state in which a majority of individuals utilize cloud-computing
services could reasonably argue that data security is of vital economic interest to
the nation. As a consequence, the state would find it necessary to extend
extraterritorial jurisdiction to these activities, en masse, without a finding of
specific harm or a showing that the CCSP has nationality. Thus, the protective
principle, unlike some of the jurisdictional principles discussed above, would
allow states to extend jurisdiction to these activities without predicating that
jurisdiction on the specific circumstances of the case, such as whether there were
harms associated with the activity. For this reason, if cloud-computing becomes
sufficiently ubiquitous and if the "limited class" of activities under the protective
principle expands, this principle could 'be a valuable form of extraterritorial
jurisdiction for states that use cloud-computing services.
IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
As the preceding Section indicates, international law may provide a
jurisdictional basis for states to prescribe cloud-computing regulation with
extraterritorial effect. But even with this ability, one may question whether a
system in which individual states exercise this kind of jurisdiction over CCSPs
would be efficient. CCSPs would have to navigate through a web of regulations,
ensuring that their systems abide by the highest level of adequacy measures and
right-to-data regimes. This would be costly and unstable, as states may initiate a
kind of race-to-the-top and attempt to ensure that their regulations are
controlling by making them the most restrictive. In addition, as discussed below,
existing international agreements may constrain the ability of states to regulate
these services at too high or too low a level. Given these problems, an ideal
solution for cloud-computing regulation, in a world in which cloud-computing
has become prevalent, is international cooperation.
Ultimately, this cooperation may manifest itself in different forms.
Cooperation may be achieved by utilizing existing international organizations,
such as the UN or the WTO, to harmonize cloud-computing regulations and set
minimum standards; states would have to meet these standards or be subject to
enforcement mechanisms already in place. Another manifestation may be a
wholly new international organization, which, instead of simply harmonizing
regulations or setting minimum standards, would be organized such that it could
actively promulgate regulations as cloud-computing service technologies
inevitably change. Finally, cooperation may manifest itself through an agreement
that divides up the relevant "space" inside the cloud to ensure that specific areas
are governed by specific sets of regulations. This would be akin to a type of law
of the sea for the computing cloud, which ensures that jurisdictions are
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demarcated and that regulatory powers are cabined off in specific areas to
prevent jurisdictional clashes.
The first part of this Section discusses ways in which existing international
agreements may constrain the ability of states to regulate cloud-computing
service providers. The second part considers the possibility of international
cooperation in the form of a harmonization of cloud-computing regulations akin
to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs).
The third part examines the possibility of a unique international organization
dedicated to promulgating or evaluating cloud-computing regulations. The final
part considers a system in which cloud-computing service providers are subject
to different laws in different parts of the cloud "space," and it uses the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea as an analytical tool in this regard.
A. Constraints on Cloud-Computing Regulation
The first constraint on a state's ability to regulate computing clouds is
derived from a WTO agreement concerning free access to services. The
constraint seems to place an upper bound on the level of regulation. The WTO
envisions a system of free trade that allows free supply of services across
member states. This principle is reflected in the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS),9 ' which discusses four different "modes" of service supply: (1)
cross-border supply, covering services flowing from the territory of one state
into another; (2) consumption abroad, covering services that have consumers
moving from one territory into another to utilize a service; (3) commercial
presence, covering service providers of one territory that create a presence in the
territory of another; and (4) presence of natural persons, covering individuals of
one territory going into another territory to provide a service.94 Importantly,
GATS also requires all members provide "treatment no less favourable than that
it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country."" These
requirements, however, are subject to a broad set of general exceptions that
must be applied reasonably." The exceptions state that nothing in the
Agreement prevents measures that are "(c) necessary to secure compliance with
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions .. . relating to

... (ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing
93
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and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of
individual records and accounts[.]" 9 '
CCSPs would undoubtedly fit into one of the "modes" of supply that the
GATS agreement purports to cover.98 The service providers, depending on how
this kind of data transfer is characterized, may be described as providing services
from one territory to another, as drawing consumers to their "territory" to
obtain cloud-computing services, or as creating a presence in another's territory
to provide the cloud-computing service. If cloud-computing services do qualify
as one of the modes, member states would be required to comply with the
prohibition on providing favorable treatment to services from one state over
another, subject to the general exceptions. Favorable treatment may arguably
include having adequacy requirements that are onerous for foreign CCSPs.
Because of the level of interconnectedness on which cloud-computing depends,
measures that are especially burdensome in one territory may make it infeasible
or unprofitable to provide transborder services in that area, forcing customers to
rely on national CCSPs that do not move data across borders.99 The EU Data
Protection Directive, for example, includes a provision that requires an
"adequate level of protection" of data before a transfer to a "third party" outside
of the EU."o Of course, the EU or states with similar protections would argue
that these regulations would be permitted under exception (c) because the
measures are specifically designed to protect privacy. But these exceptions must
be applied reasonably. Thus, the exception does not function as a carte blanche
for states; they are still prohibited from providing more favorable treatment to
regional CCSPs over foreign ones, unless the regulations are reasonably designed
to protect individuals' privacy. Some commentators note, for example, that the
Directive provision discussed above may favor services from EU nations over
US service providers in a way that would not be reasonable."'
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The second constraint seems to provide a lower bound to regulation. It is
triggered by the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
its protection of a right to privacy.' 02 A 2010 report from a UN Special
Rapporteur assisted by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
concerning the protection of privacy rights while countering terrorism,
elucidates these constraints.' 03 The report underscores the importance of a right
to privacy in the realm of data protection by calling for "a comprehensive data
protection and privacy law . .. to ensure that there are clear legal protections for
individuals to prevent the excessive collection of personal information ... [; to]
create(] limits on the use, storage, and sharing of the information[;] and [to]
mandate[] that individuals are notified of how their information is used and that
they have a right to access and redress, regardless of nationality and
jurisdiction."' 0 4 The recommendations also call for strong oversight when
personal data are collected.o Though the crux of the report concerns
government anti-terrorism measures such as wire-tapping, the right to privacy is
the actuating principle for the call to reaffirm individual rights in data. o
Moreover, the report notes in its examination of the right to privacy that "data
protection is also emerging as a distinct human or fundamental right."1 07 Thus, it
is reasonable to argue that even outside the terrorism context, this "fundamental
right" requires a certain level of protection. Though states may not be required
to comply with the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner
with regard to cloud-computing regulations, the report suggests that the right to
privacy at least requires a right to data protection as well.
B. Harmonization
International cooperation for cloud-computing regulation may come in the
form of an agreement to harmonize data protection laws. Like the TRIPs
agreement, the WTO could convene members to examine the issue and
determine the basic standards of data protection laws that would be optimal.
With the TRIPs agreement, the danger posed by a lack of harmonization meant
that companies that owned intellectual property (IP) were wary of globalizing
the use of their technology or copyrighted works because of the risk of
102

See ICCPR, Art 17 (cited in note 84).
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misappropriation. This risk was compounded when the IP was moved into
countries that did not have a sufficient level of protection. A similar concern
would exist with cloud-computing regulation. When a piece of datum moves
through different territories, there is an increased risk of loss in countries that do
not require sufficient protections for data storage or transfers. Thus, a
harmonization agreement would impose minimum standards of protection to
facilitate the free trade of cloud-computing services.
Unlike other harmonization agreements, however, an agreement to
harmonize cloud-computing regulations may pose a unique challenge in its need
also to prevent excessive regulation. With regard to IP, developing countries that
tend to produce fewer patented technologies or copyrighted works than they use
have an incentive to keep IP protection low, in order to maximize access to
technology. With regard to cloud-computing, states have an incentive to protect
their citizens' data to the greatest extent possible, with the highest level of
protection. The only limiting factor here would be if the regulations were so
onerous that the CCSPs would not provide service to particular areas. This kind
of action might also have consequences in light of GATS, if not implemented
reasonably.10 Even if these CCSPs provide service, though, excessive levels of
data protection laws have negative externalities on the system if technology or
software has to be updated at multiple nodes in several countries. Thus, a group
convened to determine proper standards of harmonization should also
determine what the appropriate level of regulation might be-that is, the optimal
level for sufficiently protecting private data while also giving CCSPs the latitude
to move data freely when necessary to increase the efficiency of the system.
One group tasked with a similar objective is Working Group VI of the UN
Commission on International Trade Law. This group's goal is to provide a
legislative guide for secured transactions law in order to harmonize the disparate
rules of individual countries.'" The justification for this harmonization is that
secured transactions would benefit from a reduction in the transaction costs of
providing capital to foreign companies. With a set of common ordering rules,
firms would be able to lend with a full understanding of their rights to collateral,
without having to learn a different set of rules and without being concerned that
the rules would change if collateral were transferred to another country. In
addition, "when countries face[ crises in their financial sector, an effective and
predictable legal framework [is] necessary. . . . In the longer term, a flexible and
effective legal framework for security rights could serve as a useful tool to
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increase economic growth."o Furthermore, the working group notes that one
of the driving forces behind the initiative is to establish modern secured credit
laws in order to "alleviate the inequalities in the access to lower-cost credit
between parties in developed countries and parties in developing countries, and
in the share such parties had in the benefits of international trade.""' Because
cloud-computing has the potential to create similar distribution effects by
providing developing countries with access to more computing power than they
might be able to have on their own, there may be a similar impetus for global
harmonization of cloud-computing regulation.
C. International Regulatory Organization
International cooperation over cloud-computing could be achieved
through an international organization specifically dedicated to regulating this
type of activity. There are very few analogies to this kind of arrangement, and
there are none of the scale that might be necessary to regulate data protection
effectively across many different countries. What would be required under this
type of system is a delegation of power, wherein the countries utilizing cloudcomputing services would agree to allow this international body to provide
oversight of the CCSPs. A call for these kinds of organizations is not new. Most
recently, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, European leaders called for an
international financial regulatory body to ensure "cross-border supervision of
financial institutions; shared global standards for accounting and regulation;
[and] a more responsible approach to executive remuneration that rewards hard
work."" 2 The advantage of having an international organization dedicated to the
task of cloud-computing is that it would be nimble enough to keep up with
rapidly changing technologies. Rather than having to force a meeting of
members of the WTO, an international CCSP regulatory body would be
technocratic in nature and help keep the system running smoothly.
D. The Cyber Sea
The final way that international cooperation could manifest itself is
through an international agreement of a different character than TRIPs or the
UNCITRAL agreement with regard to secured transactions law. UNCLOS is a
treaty designed to codify and change, where necessary, the customary law of the
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sea. The agreement addresses the problem of disputes over sea territory off of
states' territorial borders. It also staves off a tragedy of the commons by
delineating clear boundaries near coasts, and it dictates "exploration and
exploitation of [the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor] shall be carried out for
the benefit of mankind as a whole."ll 3 Essentially the agreement makes
jurisdiction in extraterritorial areas, like the exclusive economic zone, clear where
there is consensus. But importantly, it recognizes that the open ocean, or high
seas, is an area under no particular state's jurisdiction: "The high seas are open to
all States, whether coastal or land-locked." 1 l 4 When there are incidents, such as a
collision, jurisdiction is determined through the nationality of the ships or the
persons in their service."s
A similar international system may be envisioned for cloud-computing
regulation. The computing cloud may be described in completely corporeal
terms as a system of linked servers and computers connected through wires and
radio signals. Under this conception, data are simply packets of information sent
from one jurisdiction to another. But the cloud may be described differently by
pointing out that though data exist on specific servers, they may be accessed and
transferred to different servers at rapid speeds. In this way, one can imagine the
computing cloud as a sea of information, flowing freely from node to node but
difficult to pin down into a specific jurisdiction. Data moving from one country
to another go through this "cyber sea" to reach their destination. Like the sea,
too, there are bad actors. Pirates, traffickers, and smugglers take advantage of
the free flow of information to commit crimes like data theft.'16 Similarly, then, a
UNCLOS-type agreement could be set up for cloud-computing to divide the
system up by giving countries complete jurisdiction over those features of the
computing cloud that are "close" to their territory. Just as UNCLOS, in some
ways, cemented countries' jurisdiction extensions into the sea but limited such
an expansion, a "cyber sea" agreement would bless certain jurisdictional
extensions, justified by the theories put forth in the Section III, while allowing
the "cyber sea" to become an area unencumbered by innumerable jurisdictional
rules. Unlike UNCLOS, these extensions would not be delineated by physical
boundaries, but rather would be determined by the subject matter of the data at
issue. Under such an agreement, countries would be permitted to extend their
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data protection law extraterritorially when the data loss at issue is deemed highly
private (for example, Social Security Numbers) or particular to that country.
Otherwise, when there are incidents that result in data loss, the crime or act of
negligence may be said to have occurred on the "cyber high seas." For these
situations, the agreement would establish conflict of law rules to determine who
would have jurisdiction. Such a system would require a clear ex ante
understanding of how these boundaries function, but once in place, the system
might find stability by empowering each state to concern itself over its own
jurisdiction, while encouraging all states to be aware of and cooperative about
solutions for the open waters of the "cyber sea."
V. CONCLUSION
Cloud-computing represents a set of technologies that, though new and
untested, have the potential to change the way people use and interact with data.
As the growth of processor speeds and storage capacity slows with impending
technological bottlenecks, users will find it necessary to look to cloud-computing
to fulfill ever-growing performance demands. In a world of globalized
commerce, the necessity of a global cloud-computing regime will become
increasingly evident.
This Comment has discussed the viability, under international law, of two
possible equilibrium states of an international computing cloud. The first is one
in which all countries using cloud-computing services employ extraterritorial
jurisdictional theories to impose their own data protection laws abroad. Though
case law is scarce, by analogizing from the cases that discuss these principles,
jurisdictional theories such as the effects doctrine and the passive personality
principle can be used to give cloud-computing regulations extraterritorial effect.
The second equilibrium state is one in which countries work together, through
an agreement or international organization, to design a common set of data
protection laws or to minimize jurisdictional clashes by essentially divvying up
the "cloud."
Either system would facilitate the use of the technology and thus would
create the right environment for a global computing cloud to emerge. The
second of these systems, however, has the vital advantage of allowing a global
computing cloud to grow without the constraints of a thicket of data protection
regulation. Further, a "cyber seas" agreement may be the ideal vehicle for this
kind of system because it provides a balance between a state's ability to regulate
the cloud and an overseeing international authority. Regardless of the mode in
which this kind of consensus manifests itself, action taken now, while the
technology remains nascent, could enable the technology to reach its full
potential and be efficiently executed, perhaps even providing unforeseen
benefits. Thus, taking the prudent steps now to harness the cloud may, in the
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near future, allow the world to reflect on an entirely man-made, global public
utility and the beginnings of a truly cooperative world market.
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